CIA may target first U.S. citizen

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WASHINGTON — The CIA
sequence for a Predator strike ends with a missile but begins with a
memo. Usually no more than two or three pages long, it bears the name
of a suspected terrorist, the latest intelligence on his activities,
and a case for why he should be added to a list of people the agency is
trying to kill.

The list typically contains about two dozen names, a number that expands each time a new memo is signed by CIA executives on the seventh floor at agency headquarters, and contracts as targets thousands of miles away, in places including Pakistan and Yemen, seem to spontaneously explode.

No U.S. citizen has ever been on the CIA’s target list, which mainly names al-Qaida leaders, including Osama bin Laden, according to current and former U.S. officials. But that is expected to change as CIA analysts compile a case against a Muslim cleric who was born in New Mexico but now resides in Yemen.

Anwar al-Awlaki poses a dilemma for U.S.
counter-terrorism officials. He is a U.S. citizen and until recently
was mainly known as a preacher espousing radical Islamic views. But
al-Awlaki’s connections to November’s shootings at Fort Hood and the failed Christmas Day airline plot have helped convince CIA analysts that his role has changed.

“Over the past several years, Awlaki has gone from
propagandist to recruiter to operational player,” said a U.S.
counter-terrorism official.

Al-Awlaki’s status as a U.S. citizen requires
special consideration, according to former officials familiar with the
criteria for the CIA’s targeted killing program. But while al-Awlaki has not yet been placed on the CIA list, the officials said it is all but certain that he will be added because of the threat he poses.

“If an American is stupid enough to make cause with
terrorists abroad, to frequent their camps and take part in their
plans, he or she can’t expect their citizenship to work as a magic
shield,” said another U.S. official. “If you join the enemy, you join
your fate to his.”

The complications surrounding al-Awlaki’s case provide a rare glimpse into the highly secretive process by which the CIA selects targets.

CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano declined to
comment, saying that it is “remarkably foolish in a war of this kind to
discuss publicly procedures used to identify the enemy, an enemy who
wears no uniform and relies heavily on stealth and deception.”

Other current and former U.S. officials agreed to discuss the outlines of the CIA’s
target selection procedures on the condition of anonymity because of
its sensitive nature. Some wanted to defend a program that critics have
accused of causing unnecessary civilian casualties.

Decisions to add names to the CIA target
list are “all reviewed carefully, not just by policy people but by
attorneys,” said the U.S. official. “Principles like necessity,
proportionality, and the minimization of collateral damage — to persons
and property — always apply.”

The U.S. military, which has expanded its presence in Yemen,
keeps a separate list of individuals to capture or kill. Al-Awlaki is
already on the military’s list, which is maintained by the U.S. Joint
Special Operations Command. Al-Awlaki apparently survived a Dec. 24 airstrike conducted jointly by U.S. and Yemeni forces.

The CIA has also deployed more operatives and analysts to Yemen. CIA Deputy Director Stephen Kappes was in the country last month, just weeks before a Nigerian accused of training with al-Qaida in Yemen boarded a jetliner bound for Detroit on Christmas Day.

From beginning to end, the CIA’s process
for carrying out Predator strikes is remarkably self-contained. Almost
every key step takes place within the agency’s Langley, Va., campus,
from proposing targets to piloting the remotely controlled planes.

The memos proposing new targets are drafted by analysts in the CIA’s
Counter-Terrorism Center. Former officials said analysts typically
submit several new names each month to high-level officials, including
the CIA general counsel and sometimes Director Leon E. Panetta.

Former officials involved in the program said it was
handled with sober awareness of the stakes. All memos are circulated on
paper, so those granting approval would “have to write their names in
ink,” said one former official. “It was a jarring thing, to sign off on
people getting killed.”

The program is governed by extensive procedures and
rules, but targeting decisions come down to a single criterion: whether
the individual in question is “deemed to be a continuing threat to U.S.
persons or interests.”

Given that standard, the list mainly comprises al-Qaida
leaders and those seen as playing a direct role in devising or
executing attacks. Espousing violence or providing financial support to
Al Qaeda would not meet the threshold, officials said. But providing training to would-be terrorists or helping them get to Al Qaeda camps probably would.

The list is scrutinized every six months, officials
said, and in some cases names are removed if the intelligence on them
has grown stale.

“If someone hadn’t popped on the screen for over a
year, or there was no intelligence linking him to known terrorists or
plans, we’d take him off,” the former official said.

The National Security Council oversees the program, which is based on a legal finding signed after the Sept. 11 attacks by President George W. Bush. But the CIA is given extensive latitude to execute the program, and generally does not need White House approval when adding names to the target list.

The only exception, officials said, would be when the name is a U.S. citizen’s.

The CIA has at times considered adding
Americans’ names to the target list. None were ever approved, the
officials said, not because their citizenship protected them but
because they didn’t meet the “continuing threat” threshold.

Adam Gadahn, a California native now believed to be hiding in Pakistan,
has been indicted on charges of treason and providing support to
al-Qaieda. But Gadahn, former officials said, has mainly served in a
propaganda role.

Officials said that whether al-Awlaki is added to
the list hinges more on intelligence agencies’ understanding of his
role than any concern about his status as a U.S. citizen.

“If you are a legitimate military target abroad — a
part of an enemy force — the fact that you’re a U.S. citizen doesn’t
change that,” said Michael Edney, who served as deputy legal advisor to the National Security Council from 2007 until 2009.

Al-Awlaki, 38, was known for delivering fiery sermons at mosques in San Diego and suburban Virginia before moving to Yemen
in 2004. Because of his radical online postings, he has been portrayed
as a catalyst or motivator in nearly a dozen terrorism cases in the
U.S. and abroad.

But it was his involvement in the two recent cases
that triggered new alarms. U.S. officials uncovered as many as 18
e-mails between al-Awlaki and Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army major accused of killing 13 people in a shooting rampage at Fort Hood, Texas. Al-Awlaki also has been tied to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian accused of attempting to detonate a bomb on a Detroit-bound flight.

“Awlaki’s interested in operations outside of Yemen,
and he’s trying to recruit more extremists, including Westerners,” said
the U.S. counter-terrorism official. “His knowledge of Western culture
and language makes him valuable to (the offshoot) al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula.

“Taking him off the street,” the official said of al-Awlaki, “would deal a blow to the group.”

The CIA has carried out dozens of Predator strikes in Pakistan
over the last year. The program is not foolproof, as drone strikes
often kill multiple people even when the intended target escapes. The CIA
has also made grievous mistakes in counter-terrorism operations,
including capturing individuals misidentified as terrorism suspects.
But the program remains valuable to U.S. officials.

President Barack Obama alluded to the campaign in his State of the Union speech last week, saying that during his first year in office, “hundreds of al-Qaida’s fighters and affiliates, including many senior leaders, have been captured or killed — far more than in 2008.”

Many of those strikes were aimed at gatherings of
militant groups or training complexes, current and former officials
said. In such cases, the CIA is free to fire even if it does not have intelligence indicating the presence of anyone on its target list.

The CIA has carried out Predator attacks in Yemen since at least 2002, when a drone strike killed six suspected Al Qaeda operatives traveling in a vehicle across desert terrain.

The agency knew that one of the operatives was an American, Kamal Derwish, who was among those killed. Derwish was never on the CIA’s target list, officials said, and the strike was aimed at a senior al-Qaida operative, Qaed Sinan Harithi, accused of orchestrating the 2000 attack on the USS Cole.

(c) 2010, Tribune Co.

Distributed by McClatchy-Tribune Information Services.

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