that cost eight American soldiers their lives has concluded that the
small outpost was worthless, the troops there didn’t understand their
mission, and intelligence and air support were tied up elsewhere in the
province.
According to an unclassified executive summary of the report that was released to
and other news organizations Friday, “There were inadequate measures
taken by the chain of command, resulting in an attractive target for
enemy fighters.”
A statement accompanying the summary said that the
report, called an AR 15-6, suggests sanctions on higher-ranking
officers and “also recommended administrative actions for some members
of the chain of command to improve command oversight.”
The investigation found that the soldiers of Bravo Troop,
“repelled an enemy force of 300 anti-Afghan forces (AAF) fighters,
preserving their combat outpost and killing approximately 150 of the
enemy fighters. U.S. forces sustained eight killed in action and 22
wounded, all but three of whom returned to duty after the attack. The
soldiers distinguished themselves with conspicuous gallantry, courage
and bravery under the heavy enemy fire that surrounded them.”
The report also says, however, that Combat Outpost
Keating was located “deep in a bowl in Nuristan province, surrounded by
high ground,” with limited protection from one observation post. By
mid-2009, the report says, “there was no tactical or strategic value to
holding the ground occupied by COP Keating,” which had been established
to support a provincial political and economic reconstruction effort
that never materialized.
As a result, the report says, “the chain of command
decided to close the remote outpost as soon as it could.” The closure
was delayed, however, when the manpower and equipment needed to shut
the base — as well as aerial drones and other reconnaissance equipment
— were diverted to support a military operation in Barg-e-Matal, a
village elsewhere in Nuristan where U.S. forces held off surrounding
insurgents for months.
“The delayed closing of COP Keating is important as
it contributed to a mindset of imminent closure that served to impede
improvements in force protection on the COP,” the report says.
“Compounding the situation … intelligence
assessments became desensitized to enemy actions over several months,”
the report says, as insurgents launched about 47 limited attacks on the
outpost after appearing to mass for larger assaults. “Owing to this
experience with the enemy in vicinity of COP Keating, the perception
prevailed that reports of massing enemy forces were exaggerated and
improbable,” the report says.
At about
insurgents attacked the outpost and the outlying observation post in
force from the surrounding high ground. The attackers were armed with
detailed intelligence they’d collected on how the base operated and
where its weapons, generator, barracks and other key elements were.
After
When
AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, which had been at least 45 minutes
away, finally arrived, Bravo Troop’s junior officers and
noncommissioned officers regained the initiative and retook control of
the outpost.
In the following days, the soldiers withdrew from the outpost, and on
—
(c) 2010, McClatchy-Tribune Information Services.
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